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ABSTRACT 
The authors were involved in extensive vulnerability assessment and penetration testing of over 15 
large organisations across various industry sectors in the Perth CBD. The actual live testing involved a 
team of five people for approximately a four week period, and was black box testing. The scanning 
consisted of running network and web vulnerability tools, and in a few cases, exploiting vulnerability 
to establish validity of the tools. The tools were run in aggressive mode with no attempt made to 
deceive or avoid detection by IDS/IPS or firewalls. The aim of the testing was to determine firstly 
whether these organisations were able to detect such hostile scanning, and secondly to gauge their 
response. This paper does not extensively analyse the resultant empirical data from the tests this will 
be the subject of several other papers. 
Of the 15 agencies investigated, only two were able to detect the activity, and only one of these 
escalated this to authorities. Many had intrusion detection or prevention systems, but these did not 
appear to detect the scanning which was conducted. Others did not have any form of detection, only 
logging without active monitoring and some had no persistent logging of anything. Of those who did 
detect, the lack of a formal incident response and escalation plan hampered their ability to respond and 
escalate appropriately. Many of these organisations had recently, or very recently undergone 
penetration testing by external audit or IT companies, and yet there were still numerous vulnerabilities, 
or their system did not detect the scan. The conclusion is that organisations need to be very specific 
about what their needs are when engaging external agents to conduct network security testing, as 
current penetration testing is giving them a false sense of security 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines issues uncovered as a result of vulnerability assessment of information systems 
across 15 large organisations across various industry sectors in Perth, Western Australia. This 
assessment involved a team of 5 staff for a period of 3 months. There was a variety of assessments 
performed including documentation and policy review as well as live enumeration and penetration 
testing of systems over an extended period of time. The NIST SP800-115 document defines 
penetration testing as attempting to break in to a system (Scarfone et al, 2008). The reality is that most 
audit firms who conduct penetration testing are really only performing vulnerability scanning. This is 
not to be confused with vulnerability assessment, a process which examines overall security posture of 
an organisation, and examines network configuration, policy, procedure, compliance, governance and 
change management, which are all often causes of any vulnerability found by scanning. An 
appropriate analogy would be that vulnerability identifies the symptoms of security issues, whereas 
vulnerability assessment finds the cause of the disease. As such, treating the symptoms found by a 
vulnerability scanner is analogous to taking a pain killer to treat a sore throat, whereas a vulnerability 
assessment would determine that antibiotics are needed to treat the cause of the infection. 
This paper will focus on issues surrounding the penetration testing of the systems and issues 
uncovered in this process.. The organisations were told that their systems were going to be tested and 
that they should use normal escalation procedures should they detect an attack or compromise of a 
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system. The organisations were not told the nature of the testing nor its duration, magnitude or 
frequency, they were told simply when testing would start. At the conclusion of the testing period 
organisations were given an exit interview to give feedback but also to check how well if at all 
detection of attacks had occurred and what if any action had been taken. This paper outlines some of 
the macro issues and errors that are still being perpetrated by organisations. 
2. THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
The main idea or thrust behind the penetration testing was to enumerate and attack information 
systems used by the organisation for service delivery. This focus encompassed not only conventional 
email and web systems but also VPNs, video conferencing systems and a variety of bespoke systems 
that had external IP. The other primary directive was that there was to be no specialised attacks or 
advanced enumeration techniques used in the conduct of the testing. This meant attacks had to 
resemble those that could be mounted by novice users who downloaded freely available tools and used 
online information sources to educate themselves and perpertrate any malfeasance. An example of this 
was the web testing tool nikto (Sullo & Lodge, 2011) that was used in default modes no IDS/IPS 
evasion techniques were utilised. Nmap (Fyodor, 2002) similarly was used with the nmapfe frontend 
and selections of options were taken from these default menus to perform port scanning, service 
identification and operating system.  
The attack intensity also escalated in magnitude as the testing progressed for example initial 
enumeration was done doing scans that probed every 15 seconds to highly aggressive all ports all 
service scans that emanated 50-100Mbytes of traffic, across entire B Class address spaces in 5-20 
minutes. Likewise, password brute force attempts initially at low connection rates ~ 1 attempt every 5 
secs to literally the complete set of dictionaries on the Openwall CD exhausted as quickly as the tool 
or the connection could carry them. The latter with even basic bandwidth monitoring would have 
detected. 
The attack platforms were that of a home user ADSL account supplemented by cheap cloud based 
virtual servers for instance no server used cost more than $70 for a years subscription and had a 
bandwidth limit of 1TB of traffic a month. It should be noted that the servers were on fast high speed 
links and were capable of delivering sustained attacks of large volume. 
There were 3 people conducting probing of the 15 targets from a total pool of 12 real IP addresses. 
The attacks were consistently from these IPs across the 15 targets, however timing was such that any 
co-ordination of the  attacking IPs would have been coincidental beyond each attackers set of IPs. As 
to escalation the relevant authorities were aware of the testing period and the attacking IPs. 
3. TOOLS USED  
The tools used were freely available and well known attack tools they were primarily sourced from 
BackTrack 4 CDs on local laptops. The virtual servers all used Ubuntu 10.10 default installs as the 
base system that was supplemented with commonly used binaries for security testing and penetration 
such as nmap, nikto and others.  
For enumeration principally nmap was used for service and system enumerations, this was 
supplemented by the use of httprint and nikto or other specific tools as needed when enumerating or 
fingerprinting services. As previously mentioned this tools utilised nothing other than default options 
available in menus, to reflect the reality of a relative computer novice.  
For system wide attack again default tools were used perpertrate attacks against identified services or 
operating system platforms, these included nessus and metaploit. The approach with attack was an 
increase in magnitude initial attack profile was attack against an enumerated service for instance 
running a SQL injector against an identified SQL server again using default or noisy methods. This 
type of attack would not be specific for instance if the scan reported a SQL server on a Microsoft 
platform an SQL tool that attacked other platforms was utilised as well meaning that any even poorly 
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configured IDS should have detected a series of attacks.  
Having attempted lower magnitude attacks these then were systematically escalated to full noise 
indiscriminate brute force attacks.  An example is metasploit autopwn was used against a host with 
impunity and basic limitation was bandwidth of connection to carry the attack, no evasion, no tweaks. 
The final stage of attack was that of social engineering using USB memory sticks as the vector that 
was simply dropped or left within the business building perimeter. The USB vector was not designed 
to autoboot and   activate at insertion of the drive. The USB had 3 files on it namely a readme.txt, a 
modified binary called encryptor.exe and a false file called crypted.vol that contained random 
characters.  For the USB to call home via a DNS request the human actor had to run the encryptor.exe 
and attempt a password.  
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The extensive data from the testing are still being analysed however the following statements put the 
extent of the exposures uncovered in perspective for the purposes of the discussion.  
• All organisations were readily and easily enumerated with only 2 organisations being aware of the 
probing.  
• All organisations had significant exposures uncovered in the network scanning and testing.  
• All except one of the organisations detected the intense scans and attacks of the system. 
• All except one of the organisations did any tangible, credible and trackable escalation of incidents. 
• Some of the organisations logging and record keeping is that poor that no evidence could be located 
post testing. 
• Only one organisation was not compromised by USB stick attack. Two external IT providers to the 
organisations were also compromised. 
• All USBs were effective within less than 48 hours of being dropped at the organisations. 
4.1 Escalation and responses or lack thereof 
All organisations showed no or extremely poor escalation of incident to authorities. Only two of the 15 
organisations escalated the attacks to authorities for further investigation. This is alarming in that 13 
organisations failed to detect and effectively respond to sustained attacks on their systems.  
To their credit, two organisations provided some response but again there are concerns in their level of 
response. One organisation undertook what can be best described as multiple agency contact, basically 
contacting anyone who would listen. This mass alerting was conducted against the organisations 
policy which had a person in a designated position would make the call and then only to one agency. 
This demonstrates poor organisational awareness of policy, which may indicate a lack of training or 
familiarity with escalation.  
Another organisation had succumbed to crying wolf or demonstrated Hawthornian effects in response, 
such that they were contacting agencies and reporting attacks from the attack team when in fact they 
had been idle on that organisation for 10 days. Basically, other IPs that were actually attacking from a 
home based DSL account within the Western Australian ISP IP address spaces were being attributed 
to the attack teams efforts and escalated to responder agencies.  
An intentional ruse was effective in that while attacking with the home based DSL accounts 
simultaneously high intensity attacks and probes were being perpetrated from the large bandwidth 
virtual server accounts with no reporting of these apparent by any of the responding organisations. 
Feedback from responder agencies has been that escalation and reporting was inadequate and 
presented no real opportunity for defending systems. In particular one responding agency has resolved 
to undertake an education and advice program to inform operators how best to report a cyber attack in 
order to get resolution of the attack. 
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4.2 Technology tokenism 
Some of the organisations had expensive dedicated security appliances that were deployed and 
inadequately managed, which indicates these organisations are suffering from technology tokenism. It 
could be that staff were not trained in the use of these appliances, which indicates strongly that 
organisations should look at the total investment cost which includes ongoing training and support for 
staff. Also, many of the network borne threats are complex, multi-partite and asymmetric. The modern 
security appliance is a highly complex system and needs constant adjustment to get optimal 
performance from it. 
4.3 Security is so inconvenient 
IT Staff from several organisations reported a lack of acceptance or recognition of risk in IT systems 
by upper management. One organisation relayed that they had in fact tried to secure USB ports by 
disabling them through policy management afforded by Windows XP. Soon after deployment was 
enacted they were summarily told to undo this by top line management as it was not convenient and 
USB posed no real threat or risk to the organisation. There were also similar vignettes communicated 
where executives was not aware of or did not want to acknowledge the clear and present danger that 
not deploying or enabling security measures brought to the organisation.  
4.4 Post incident forensics 
Another stage of this activity is the investigation of post incident ability to respond to evidentiary 
requirements and also provide data for analysis of incidents. The analysis of any log files or intrusion 
data is not yet complete however there have been uncovered significant issues already in this phase.  
Several of the organisations have not been able to provide any tangible log file data. There are several 
reasons, the most alarming is that preservation of log files is not occurring beyond a short time 
window of a week to a few days dependant upon logging activity i.e the log files are live and simply 
utilise fifo. There is no daily archiving or storage of log data in these organisations, which under WA 
state law is a breach of the State Records Act, let alone the fact its basic security practice. Any 
argument that storage space or performance of appliance is a significant issue is a very tired IT 
industry meme. Hard disk storage is incredibly cheap and devices are sufficiently powerful that any 
logging is now in the realms of 1-2 per cent of CPU and if an IPS or device is that marginal bigger 
issues are afoot. 
Several of the organisations do not know how to extract data from their IDS/IPS, firewall systems 
when this information was requested they have supplied HTML documents taken from their system 
management consoles. This is clearly an inadequate response. 
4.5 Penetration Testing vs. Vulnerability Assessment 
Of concern is that nearly all organisations examined in this research had recently paid external 
companies to conduct penetration tests against their infrastructure. The evidence presented as a result 
of examining these 15 organisations is that penetration testing seems to have almost zero value, whilst 
having a very high cost, both in monetary and security terms. 
The profile of companies employed to conduct such penetration testing are commonly audit 
organisations for which their major business is financial audit. However, the growth in the use of the 
internet for e-commerce and other core business functions has seen these organisations branch out into 
IT security auditing, or so called ethical hacking. As such, when an organisation requests an external 
audit of their organisations, an evaluation of the health of general computer controls as they relate to 
financial system access is also conducted. Increasingly, organisations are also being sold ethical 
hacking or penetration testing in relation to their internet facing infrastructure. In addition to being part 
of a financial audit, organisations are also using these same audit firms to conduct ad-hoc assessment 
of their network infrastructure as part of change management or configuration changes.  
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There are anecdotal reports from some organisations that the companies conducting these tests 
commonly ask them to add them to a firewall or IPS white list or to turn off certain security features so 
that they can conduct the test. Such an approach may allow for testing of an individual component 
with a companies defence infrastructure, but it certainly does not test or evaluate the security of an 
organisation as a whole. Standard practice for such organisations is to use recent graduates armed with 
a tool (commonly Nessus and Nmap) to run scans against the target organisation who requested the 
test. Whilst the people using the tools may have been adequately trained and instructed, they are far 
from network security experts, or even ethical hackers, as they sometimes refer to themselves. 
In defence of the audit organisations, they are likely only providing the service which they are asked to 
perform. That is, organisation A asks for, and receives a penetration test of their firewall. Is this a 
useful test of organisation A’s security? No, but it is what they requested. Having said that, there 
appears to be an ethical issue in relation to charging large amounts of money for a test which is largely 
worthless, regardless of whether the organisation specifically requested it or not. 
Of far greater value to an organisation is a vulnerability assessment which assesses the overall security 
posture of an organisation, including such aspects as policy, procedure, physical security, change 
management and governance. For example, a penetration test may find an open port on a firewall that 
should have been closed. In that instance, the recommendation is to close the port. A vulnerability 
assessment, through an examination of the firewall rule sets, would also pick up that a port was open. 
However, the recommendation would then be to look at change management and policy and procedure 
in relation to network security as to why the port was open, and to prevent such an issue occurring in 
the future. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This engaged research has resulted in uncovering significant issues that need addressing in 
organisations with respect to preparedness to attack, response, escalation and investigation of external 
attack of cyber systems.  
All of these organisations have an IT department and in some cases have personnel responsible for 
security which mitigates the resourcing defence that many organisations put forward, some also 
outsource their daily IT security to specialist firms. Many have also paid large amounts of money to 
external audit agencies to conduct penetration tests against their infrastructure. However in defence of 
the IT staff in these IT departments often security of systems is compromised by poor management 
decisions as result of poor understanding of IT based risk. This is all too a common theme in 
investigations of this sort and something both sides of the IT management divide need to work on. 
There was largely systemic failure to detect and respond to the attacks. Only 2 out of the 15 
organisations provided any semblance of coherent response to the attacks, the other 13 can only be 
categorised risk wise as extreme. The work has uncovered that there is significant fundamental work 
that needs to be undertaken in these organisations before any semblance of an IT security posture or 
awareness could be proclaimed.  
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